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Abstract 
The article covers the methodology used to design safety control systems for unattended points of technological communication 
on oil and gas pipelines; it gives the review of safety control system design, the relevance of the researched area and research 
methods; it describes the structure of an unattended point of technological communication, specific hazardous factors, affecting 
factors; the article focuses on the possible safety system structures, suggests the ways to select the necessary safety system 
structure, the design of its central block and qualitative content of information sources on hazardous factors; it describes the 
mathematical model for quantitative safety assessment, and shows the results of the research outcome implementation in the  
safety systems in operation. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
Currently oil and gas branches are deemed as significant industry areas for Russia. One of the crucial factors in 
these branches is the most effective and safe transportation of oil and gas from the fields up to the consumer. This 
activity is generally performed via oil and gas pipelines. The control of pipeline conditions requires diverse systems 
of Telemechanics; the connection with these systems is provided by the lines of specialized technological 
communication set along the pipeline. Technological communication efficiency directly affects the efficiency of 
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transportation – communication break, and namely the lack of data about real-time pipeline condition, is taken as a 
kick and has to be removed immediately. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Simplified scheme of a standard technological communication point. 
 
Simplified scheme of a standard technological communication unit is given in Figure 1. 
APTC (attended point of technological communication) is defined as communication construction where data 
transmission system equipment is installed. The operation personnel are working 24 hours.  
UPTC (unattended point of technological communication) is defined as communication construction where data 
transmission system equipment is installed. In this case no personnel is required; the point either operates 
automatically (not typical on oil and gas pipelines) or is fully distantly operated (also in most cases not typical on oil 
and gas pipelines), or operates in an automated mode, when the operator is required only in specific non-nominal 
cases.   
Data transmission channel is a physical environment where data transmission is performed (copper cable, optical 
cable, radio channel).  
If we consider the technological communication as a consecutive system when the break of any component leads 
to the breakdown of the whole system in general, we can say that the efficiency of technological communication is 
determined by the efficiency of the weakest element.  
The weakest point of technological communication is unattended communication points as there are no personnel 
at these points who can react in non-nominal situations.  
Hence we face the problem of controlling the efficiency and safety of the operation of unattended technological 
communication points. Safety control systems are to be applied in order to tackle this issue; these systems should be 
specially designed for the technological communication of oil and gas pipelines. 
2. Survey 
The issue of the methodology of safety systems’ design is generally covered in a big number of scientific and 
practice oriented works. 
Tikhonova V.A. and Vorona V.A. thoroughly focus in their papers on the methodology of design and different 
elements of safety control systems [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7].  
Ryzhova V.A. develops certain methodology aspects [8].  
Petrov S.V. [9] gives in his paper the set of recommendations how to provide the safety of production units.  
The issues of efficiency assessment are covered in the works of Ryabinin I.A. [10].  
You can read more about the elements of alarm system in the works of Vinogradov Yu.A. [11] and Magauenov 
R.G.  [12, 13].  
One of the most significant components of almost any safety control system and namely video surveillance is 
taken up in the works of Gedsberg Yu.M., [14], Peskin A.E. [15] and Gvozdeka M. [16].  
 Fire protection tools are considered in the paper of Lepeshkin O.M., Kopytov V.V. and Zhuk A.P. [17]. 
Certain methodology elements are given in the government regulations [18, 19]. 
3. Research relevance 
Despite the considerable research of the issue that has been done in the general context, the issue of the 
methodology of safety control systems applied to the unattended points of technical communication hasn’t been 
taken up in any of the works given above as unattended points of technological communication on oil and gas 
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pipelines started to be massively used quite recently.   
It should also be stressed out that currently there is a steady trend towards the growth of the amount of 
unattended points of technological communication on oil and gas pipelines. This growth is explained by the 
construction of new communication lines, initially designed as automated lines; the re-equipment of existing 
technological communication lines also contributes to this growth. Automation is triggered by the steady current 
trend of minimizing the impact of a human factor on communication efficiency; it can also be explained by 
economic reasons, and namely the decrease of overhead expenses and the increase of profitability.     
Hence it can be concluded that the development of the methodology for the design of safety control systems and 
the efficiency of unattended points of technological communication on oil and gas pipelines is a crucial and relevant 
task nowadays; currently this issue hasn’t been fully solved yet. 
4. Research methods 
Based on the experience of theoretical and practical activities in the sphere of providing and assessing the safety 
the authors suggest the following research program:   
x Define object structure (“What are we protecting?”); 
x Determine typical hazardous factors and their affecting factors (“What are we protecting from?”); 
x Determine the structure of the safety system (“How do we protect?”); 
x Determine safety methods (“What do we use for protection?”); 
x Define quantitative safety parameter (“How to assess the protection?”). 
5. UPTC structure 
Refer to the works of the following authors [20] to study this issue in the context of the facilities set on the point. 
The structure is given in the Figure 2. 
 
Fig. 2. UPTC Structure in the context of the facilities set on the point. 
6. Typical danger for UPTC and their affecting factors 
That issue was studied in the works of the following authors [20].  
The typical UPTC hazardous factors are as follows: 
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x The factors of a natural character: icing of premises, high humidity in premises, flooding of premises; 
x Technogene factors: fire in the premises, compressed air cylinder explosion, significant decrease of 
communication quality, power supply interruption; 
x Social factors: vagrancy, thefts. 
Find below the list of affecting factors that are to be controlled by UPTC safety system (set by decreasing the 
priority): 
x Communication quality; 
x Electric current; 
x Electric voltage; 
x Air temperature; 
x Air moisture; 
x Unauthorized access; 
x Pressure in compressed air cylinders. 
7. The structure of safety control system 
Generalized structure of safety control system is given in the Figure 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Generalized structure of safety control system. 
 
UPTC safety control system necessarily should connect with the remote operator in order to run manual 
monitoring of unit safety and take solutions in complicated non-nominal cases.   
As already mentioned in the papers [21], there are different kinds (concepts) of the structure (architecture) of 
safety control systems described bellow. 
7.1. Module architecture concept 
Module architecture concept is shown on Figure 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Module architecture. 
 The central block that is responsible for taking safety control solutions includes the minimum number of 
functions, but can connect with a big number of additional divergent modules. This approach makes system 
architecture more complicated via additional  communications and reduces the efficiency via a big number of 
connections; at the same time the space of system application significantly increases and labor input is decreasing. 
7.2. Monolithic architecture structure 
Monolithic architecture structure is shown on Figure 5. 
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Fig. 5. Monolithic architecture. 
The central block includes all the functions and gives no possibility to extend them. Such approach simplifies 
system architecture and increases the efficiency, but in this case application space is constricting and labor input 
expenses are elevating. 
7.3. Mixed architecture concept 
Mixed architecture concept is shown on Figure 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Mixed architecture. 
The central block contains a number of functions set as main functions; all minor functions are connected via 
extension modules. By such approach there is a combination of flexible application, slight increase of system 
complexity and labor input as well as slight reduction of efficiency.       
We suggest taking mixed architecture concept for UPTC safety control system; the validation of this idea is 
given below:   
x The place of system application is determined, which means that the factor of wide application is not relevant; 
hence module architecture is irrelevant either; 
x Despite the fact that all main affecting factors are defined some typical UPTC hazardous factors might occur 
which means that the possibility should be considered to expand the system; hence monolithic architecture is 
irrelevant. 
Therefore UPTC safety control system should contain in the central block sensors’ supports to control all the 
typical affecting danger factors (described above) and have interface to connect extension modules. 
8. The control of hazardous factors 
The control of hazardous factors is performed with help of the information that comes from the tool that 
measures hazardous factors into the central block (Figure 3).  
According to the paragraph “Typical UPTC dangers and their affecting factors” UPTC safety control systems 
require the following tools: 
x Temperature sensor; 
x Smoke sensor; 
x Air moisture sensor; 
x Sensor of water in the premises; 
x Measuring indicator of current value in the network; 
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x Measuring indicator of voltage value in the network; 
x Measuring indicator of communication quality; 
x Video cameras. 
We cannot generally define specific characteristics and measurement permission of each sensor or indicator that 
measures an affecting factor, as by different UPTC we can deal with different conditions, therefore we need a wide 
range of sensors or differently configured sensors.       
It should be noted that if possible hazardous factor measurement tools should have a unified interface to connect 
with the central block in order to reduce the number of mechanical connectors and consequently increase general 
system efficiency. 
9. Protection methods 
The follow protection methods are offered: 
x From natural character’s danger factors: frosting of the room – setup of heater, high humidity of air into the room 
– setup of air driers or automatic ventilation systems, flooding of the room – setup of exhaust pumps; 
x From industrial character’s danger factors: fire in the room – setup of fire-prevention systems, power supply 
termination – setup of reserve power supply sources, explosion of cylinders with compressed air – maximum 
removal of cylinders with compressed air from communication equipment (into the territory of UPTC) in special 
room; 
x From social character’s danger factors: plunder – setup of closed-circuit television systems. 
More than, at any object’s protection-reduce situation UPTC must send signal to the similar APTC. 
10. Quantitative safety assessment 
Based on the following works [22, 23, 24] we worked out a simplified mathematical model (1) for quantitative 
safety assessment.  
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where T – temperature, V – moisture, U – electric voltage, I – electric current, Tlim  - maximum temperature limit, 
Vlim  - maximum moisture limit, Ulim  - naximum electric voltage limit, Ilim  - naximum electric current limit, Ĳlim  - 
naximum time limit  of exposure duration, ȡ lim  - maximum distance limit of exposure, Ti(t), Vi(t), Ui(t), Ii(t), Ĳi(t), 
ȡi(t)   – respectively the current values of temperature, moisture, electrical voltage and current, exposure time, 
exposure distance. ɋT, CV, CU, CI, CĲ, Cȡ  - the truncation coefficients of the truncated normal law of temperature, 
moisture, electrical voltage and current, exposure time, exposure distance. M(Ti(t)), M(Vi(t)), M(Ui(t)), M( Ii(t)), 
M(Ĳi(t)), M(ȡi(t)) – mathematical expectation of a random variable of temperature, moisture, electrical voltage and 
current, exposure time, exposure distance. lT, lV, lU, lI, lĲ, lȡ  –manifestations’ intensity of random changes of 
temperature, moisture, electrical voltage and current, exposure time, exposure distance. t – current time. 
 
In this model we don’t consider the hazardous factor of unauthorized access and a number of other specific 
moments; but many authors believe that in most cases received values are relevant enough and by the determination 
of legitimate values of safety parameter the algorithm can be used in safety control system. 
11. Implementation results 
Theoretical data that were received in the research were used by running the updating works for safety control 
systems of the production organization Science & Technology Center “SIMOS” JSC, city Perm, Russia. The 
following results were received (extract from implementation act):    
«The recommendations <…> were used at  the Science & Technology Center “SIMOS” JSC, city Perm for the 
further development and improvement of safety control systems and the efficiency of unattended points of 
technological communication on oil and gas pipelines which were developed and produced by the enterprise. 
Particularly the implementation was performed in the system of video surveillance. These recommendations extend 
the functionality of the system and increase its efficiency. The Chief Constructor Tchumakov O.B., Science & 
Technology Center “SIMOS” JSC”. 
12. Conclusion 
The article describes the methodology of safety control systems’ design for unattended points of technological 
communication on oil and gas pipelines; it shows the results of implementing research outcome in real-time 
operating safety systems. 
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